Category Archives: EU

Why the young in Germany do not mobilize against precarity

by Vera Trappmann

Vera Trappmann

Employment in precarious conditions in Germany as in many other countries is above all young, feminine and migratory. More than half of German under-24-year-olds have only a short-term work contract; of the under-35-year-olds this is still 30 percent; half of all temporary workers are under age 35; 23 percent are employees in the low-wage sector; 26% of 18-24-year-olds live under the poverty line. As if that were not enough, one-fourth of those in educational transitional programs, 10% are neither in work nor in training, (so-called NEETs,) and 6% of young people leave school without any qualification. However, interestingly, the young precarious workers do not really mobilize against precarity, at least not massively. Even under conditions of sectoral relaxed labour markets, young precarious workers tend not to engage in conflict with their employers or participate in protest but rather remain passive, sympathetic supporters of trade unions and wait until their earning situation is no longer precarious before they mobilize (Thiel and Eversberg 2017).

In the following I will try to explain this puzzle by looking at subjective factors that lead to or hamper mobilization. The focus on subjective factors does not dismiss the role of context and norms (Menz and Nies 2016), it is just a dimension that has been neglected so far. I will use Hirschman’s (1970) scheme of exit, voice and loyalty as potential reactions towards precarity and explain in turn what leads to individual strategies of loyalty, voice or rather exit. We can distinguish push and pull factors on the individual biographical level for each phenomenon. The analysis draws on results of the PREWORK project[1] where we conducted 60 biographic interviews with precariously living young adults under age 35.

Voice, Exit and Loyalty as strategies towards precarity

Voice

Voice is understood here as the mobilization of workers. Other than classic literature on mobilization I will not look at organisational factors (Kelly 1998) but at individual biographical motifs.  First, and very uniquely, mobilization in our sample occurred only among those who have high cultural capital (higher academic degrees), and second who ascribe to their occupation a high priority. They had a strong occupational identity with intrinsic work motivation, such as in knowledge workers, researchers, artists or medical doctors. If the occupation has no high priority in life, there is no mobilization.

Furthermore, third, a precondition for activation seemed to be a consciousness of injustice, or the experience of injustice in the course of one’s biography, and particularly social injustice. The critique of concrete working conditions in a profession then led to engagement in the field of work and especially mobilization. Fourth, we found that a highly developed feeling of self-efficacy is vital for mobilization. By self-efficacy we follow Bandura’s (1997) understanding as being the conviction that one can achieve through one’s own behaviour certain results, while the dimension “environmental control” distinguishes whether events are influenced through individual actions (agency [i.e. indirectly]) or rather through external circumstances such as luck, destiny, or other powerful persons and the like. He distinguishes four types of self-efficacy— based on the self-perceived level of self-efficacy and possibility for controlling the environment — that lead either to social engagement and protest, to apathy and resignation, or to an over-conformity to the environment.

Fifth, in all mobilized respondents there occurred a conflictive separation from parents. It appeared almost as if the widespread modern approach to upbringing leads to an a-politization, and that the rejection of parents’ lifestyles promotes political engagement.

Pull-factors played also a huge role, it were a strong recruitational field of societally critical student groups, subcultures, personal role models and a range of available ideologies and appealing narratives that sound demanding but not impossible.

Veras Voice graphics

If we look at Noah as an example. He is 28, broke off his studies and took up a carpenter’s apprenticeship. His trade he considers almost an artistic activity, and it provides him with a strong occupational identity. For Noah, it is less the concrete working conditions in a firm that are important, and more the general working conditions in the capitalist system, that he rejects. Therefore, he joined a cooperative in which the incomes of the members are pooled and divided among all, so that all members are less dependent on individual orders and less on the ability and necessity to work constantly. For Noah the process of separation from his parents had a strong influence on his engagement in the politics of work. As his parents separated in a painful custody battle, Noah fled into in the punk scene and lived on the street. At age 18, he travelled for almost two years by bicycle through Europe and during this time] read leftist literature. His experience of the failure of the small-family model drove him to seek togetherness in alternative, collective structures. He lives in leftist-oriented communal housing project and engages himself in an anarchist union movement. His activity in the politics of work is for him a strong expression of his estrangement from the failed life-model of his parents.

Loyalty

The contrary case – no critique of conditions, but rather adaptation to them — presumes, one could say, is the absence of all these factors, though we can in fact elaborate a few own factors that foster loyalty. Above all this is an effect of the normalization of precarity: it is no longer perceived as something bad. Rather, it is considered something temporary; a difficult situation that can, when the youth phase has passed, or with a substantial educational investment, resolve itself. Here a strong belief in meritocracy is of consequence. If I invest enough, the system will reward me. Here is also the reason why, with equally high self-efficacy as in the “voice” type, no collective action ensues, but instead the logic of individual maximation prevails, with precarity remedied individually. At the same time, here the individual resources of actors are already significantly taken up by the management of the challenging, stressful youth phase. Too many things are waiting at the same time, above all the social pressure to “find yourself”. That is accompanied by the so-called neoliberal, unauthentic Self which, in the words of the economist Wrenn (2015), totally inflates the perception of one’s own ability to act, and in particular the control over the environment and tries to make the individual believe that all changes to the environment should be possible on the basis of individual agency and individual responsibility for everything. The unauthentic Self cannot recognize structures anymore. Adaptation or perhaps rather blockade; to undertake something in some direction; these motivations originate in great measure from precariousness. As Butler (2009) does, one can speak here of the physical and emotional vulnerability of all life, against which individuals try to immunize themselves. Many of our blocked subjects still suffer today from effects of childbirth, childhood neglect, the experience of violence, or chronic health problems. The experience of chronic illness or social mobbing may lead to loneliness and isolation. It is possible however that individuals in this type of situation may over the course of their biography decide on voice mechanisms if their precarity persists even beyond youth.

Graphics2

Anna is an interesting case in Loyalty. Anna is 30, has two Master’s degrees, several internships behind her, international work and academic experience and up to now has had still no work contract lasting more than 6 months. As an adopted child in an upper middle-class family, she enjoyed generous support during her education and is financially secured against sudden need by her parents as well as by her long-standing boyfriend and now husband. Despite this, the long job-application phase after her studies she has spent in a state of depression. Anna is still searching for a suitable occupational profile for herself. Although she suffers from insecurity and her current work situation in a public administrative position and complains of the short-term contracts, she holds fast to the idea that through sufficient effort she will at some future time find a secure position.

Exit

The third variant, exit, means here above all the retreat into the private, or, if within employment, a switch of sector, a change from formal work to informal or even illegal work or resignation from employment. The escape motif ranges from taking a sabbatical, regular pauses, leaving on a trip or bike by bus, or all the way to founding a permanent commune in Spain.

Among biographical factors in taking the exit option we identify the lack of recognition. But also, young adults who are trying to find their initial place in the occupational world and fail, may then rather give up especially if the work is disagreeable and makes them sick, and then also choose the exit option. And when an alternative income is available, one can also rather afford to choose exit. The welfare state makes possible for some young women an early motherhood that, also after a separation from the partner, is financially secured if only on a low level, and thereby the mother role may replace the employment or occupational orientation.

Graphics3

Cynthia is a good example for a highly qualified person who due to lack of recognition chooses exit. She is 35 at the time of the interview and like Anna she has both a German and international Master’s degree and had already collected a multitude of positions in her work history, in precarious jobs in different areas (at university, gastronomy, logistics). The option of doctoral studies, research and teaching she rejects because in her experience, university working conditions are unhealthy (overwork, stress, lack of security and recognition). As co-researcher in a research project in which she was employed for two years on renewable research-assistant contracts, she received — despite her responsible job — no sufficient pay, job security, social security or the possibility of co-determination in the organizational unit.

Though Cynthia saw in this work at least in part an opportunity for her own self-realization, this ultimately did not turn out so for her, so that she gradually withdrew from the labour market and [finally] emigrated to Spain to live in a commune.

Any scope for change?

We have shown here to what extent, irrespective of labour market, sector, or welfare state institutions, the mobilization of workers depends on biographical resources. If biographical factors play a huge role, then it is legitimate to ask if and how can biographical conditions be changed to make young workers more critical towards precarity? The answer is mainly through changes in the conditions of social context. The management of the effects of a traumatic childhood is best left to therapists, but the framework conditions for the politicization of work can however be adjusted by diverse societal actors, certainly unions, but also media, politics, NGOs and researchers.

In Germany, the protest of the precarious youth in comparison to other countries developed late. Possibly the protest will continue. Strikes by deliveroo drivers (i.e. riders, couriers), and collective wage increases for student part-timers could be an indication. It should however succeed to create communication spaces in which collective identities are formed that can exercise social criticism. In consideration of the scarce effect that can be had on biographical push-factors in the short term, only pull-factors remain as an arena for action, above all the attraction of ideology; here it should succeed to underscore the fact that social inequality is not an economic necessity or the result of different individual investments, but rather the result of political struggles in the arena of work. (Bourdieu 1998)

[1] www.prework.eu

References

Bandura, A. (1997) Self-efficacy in changing societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Bourdieu, P. (1998) Gegenfeuer. Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstands gegen die neoliberale Invasion. Frankfurt: Büchergilde Gutenberg.

Butler, J. (2009) Frames of War. When is Life Grievable? London, New York: Verso

Hirschman, A. (1970) Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]: Harvard Univ. Press.

Kelly, J.E. (1998) Rethinking industrial relations mobilisation, collectivism and long waves. New York: Routledge.

Menz, W./ Nies, S. (2016) Gerechtigkeit und Rationalität – Motive interessenpolitischer Aktivierung. WSI Mitteilungen, (7), 530.

Thiel, M./Eversberg, D. (2017) Normalisierte Prekarität und kollektive Solidarität. Eine junge Beschäftigtengeneration entdeckt die Interessenvertretung wieder, in: Berliner Debatte Initial, (3), 58.

Wrenn, M. V. (2015). Agency and neoliberalism. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 39(5), 1231.

 

CERIC Doctoral Conference 2018

020.JPG

Emma Partlow

By Emma Partlow, Postgraduate Researcher, Department of Social Policy, Sociology and Criminology (University of Birmingham)

I was honoured to have been invited to present my research at the Centre for Employment Relations Innovation and Change (CERIC) Doctoral Conference on the 20th June at Leeds University Business School. As a doctoral student from the University of Birmingham, it was a pleasure to network within a room full of people who articulated original and innovative research in such an engaging manner.

The conference encompassed a wide-range of disciplines, including: Social Policy, Languages and Cultural Studies, Psychology, Performance and Cultural Industries and of course, Business and Management in its many forms. It was exciting to see how a diverse range of talks could marry together under the banner of Inequalities in the Workplace. These talks encompassed everything from: sexual harassment in the workplace, strategic human resource management, apprenticeships, inequalities in skills developments during recessions, collective labour conflicts in China, case study on the Nigerian Electricity Distribution Sector, sex work, organisational stress management, pay gaps and inequality, labour insecurity, marginalisation of theatre lighting designers, power in modern management, and the employment experiences of people with Multiple Sclerosis. Not forgetting the key note talk from Professor Chris Forde who kicked off the day so eloquently with the ‘Inequalities of Work in the 21st Century – The Rise of the Gig Economy’.

094

Participants of the Doctoral Conference

I am fortunate to have had the opportunity to present my research project looking at the impact of equalities legislation on disabled people in the workplace, which critically analyses the concept of ‘reasonable adjustments’ in the policy context of the Government’s White Paper Improving Lives. The audience were receptive to my theoretical framing, which sees me draw upon the concept of bio-power and subtle coercion in the form of Libertarian Paternalism.

Doctoral students eloquently presented their work and the day flew by with methodological discussions, engaging debate and suggestions within an entirely supportive and ‘safe’ space. It has to be said that this was one of the most supportive academic spaces I have had the pleasure to participate in. The development of spaces where doctoral students can engage in supportive discussion about their work is important and something we must actively continue to arrange.  I am sure I am not alone when I say that questions, comments and suggestions received in this manner are invaluable and can go a long way in supporting a thought-process or the development of ideas.

I would like to thank CERIC and Leeds University Business School for their generosity and hospitality. Not only did they host this doctoral conference and provided refreshments and lunch but prizes were provided for the prize winners and I am honoured to have been chosen as one of these prize winners. The prizes were put forward to help with the cost of attending conferences of choice; I think this is an excellent incentive to encourage people to share their work, regardless of the stage they are at within their doctoral journey.

091

From left to right: joint 1st prize winner for best paper presentation Maisie Roberts (CERIC), Dr Jo Ingold, joint 1st prize winner  Marina Boulos (CERIC), joint winner for the best poster presentation Sophie Morrell (Bradford) and 2nd prize winner for best paper presentation Emma Partlow (Birmingham)

The success of this doctoral conference has inspired me to adopt the theme of ‘Inequalities and Work’ to host a conference at the University of Birmingham so please do watch this space! It would be my pleasure to welcome some familiar and friendly faces to Birmingham and to hear how your work has developed since this event.

Brexit, EU labour migration & worker rights: the story so far

Immigration and restricting EU migrant rights to freedom of movement were core issues in the lead up to the referendum vote, yet agreement on the detail of a new UK immigration policy continues to be a way off, leaving employers, workers and their families in limbo. Researchers based in the Centre for Employment Relations Innovation and Change (CERIC) at LUBS working on labour migration, mobility and changing patterns of work, have been working with different interest groups (business, unions and civil society) in a unique way to enhance understanding of how these groups are coping with the uncertain impacts of the Brexit vote. This exploratory research provides insight into the ongoing challenges of trying to anticipate, respond to and shape migration policy for and on behalf of their members in an uncertain context. This blog sets out the background and how the CERIC team’s research agenda is being shaped by bringing different interest groups together on this emotive and evolving topic.

Current context

After the BREXIT vote in June 2016, UK and EU negotiators signaled that reaching agreement on the rights of EU and UK citizens already living in another member state was a priority. Yet, it was only on 8th of December 2017 that UK and EU negotiators published a joint report outlining principles on the treatment of EEA nationals in the UK and UK nationals in the EU and on 21st June 2018, that the UK government announced details of the ‘settled status[1]’ scheme. Campaign groups point to many ‘unsettled’ questions about this process and the new forms of regulation of EU labour mobility post-Brexit. An immigration bill was announced in January 2017 but was subsequently put on hold until wider Brexit negotiations are progressed. The UK government has indicated EU freedom of movement will end, but migration policy continues to be shaped by the wider negotiations with the EU and ongoing internal political processes and policy analysis. The Home Secretary instructed the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC)[2] to report by September 2018 on the impact of EEA workers on the UK labour market and the Home Affairs Select Committee is undertaking an inquiry into Post-Brexit Migration Policy.[3] Thus, there continues to be both formal and informal spaces for dialogue between different groups of social actors seeking to shape these outcomes.

While these deliberative processes are ongoing, net migration has slowed considerably since the referendum vote. According to the ONS[4], the largest drop in net migration to the UK to occur in decades was experienced in the period June 2016 to June 2017 falling from 336,000 to 230,000: three quarters of this fall was due to the drop in migration from the EU. More recent statistics show that migration from the EU has continued to fall. The ONS reports notes that ‘the numbers of EU citizens coming to the UK looking for work decreased by 58,000 over the year to September 2017, particularly driven by the fall in numbers of citizens from EU15 and EU8[5] countries (24,000 and 18,000 respectively). For the latter, this is the lowest number recorded since accession. Recent polls[6] suggest that the UK general public’s perception of immigration has softened since the Brexit referendum, yet the ONS migration data are indicative of the material effects felt by workers, and by extension employers, of the ongoing uncertainty of how the UK will regulate EU labour mobility post-Brexit.

Employers, legal advisors, trade unions, civil society and faith groups and local, national and international authorities all have concerns around the implications of Brexit for their various constituents and are variously involved in the political debates noted above. The positions and actions of these different interest groups, therefore, have important implications for the changing socio-economic relationship between the UK and the European Union and for the UK’s own social model. Some of these groups seek to be a counterweighing power to social, political and media forces seeking a ‘hard’ Brexit outcome and stricter regulation of EU labour migration to the UK. These groups are also critical in shaping the environment that affects the everyday experience of those that exercised their right to free movement between the UK and the EU. CERIC’s research has been on exploring actions and reactions of these groups within this extraordinary period of uncertainty by asking a set of inter-related questions: How do different social actors imagine the migration landscape post-Brexit? What challenges and consequences of Brexit do they anticipate for labour mobility? How are they formulating policy positions and trying to shape the debate around the new post-Brexit immigration system?

 

Brexit roundtable

CERIC BREXIT and labour mobility roundtable
September 2017

By critically exploring the competing visions of what the UK’s new social model might look like and bringing together the voices of different interest groups we are generating new data and promoting dialogue as part of our commitment to developing research that is co-produced: giving different stakeholders a voice in shaping the key research questions and design[7]. The framing of these questions aims to not only understand and amplify these diverse voices but also to bring different actors together to discuss complex questions. To realise this aim CERIC researchers have undertaken scoping interviews and both hosting and participating in roundtable events exploring common concerns and areas of difference with respect to the question of labour mobility around four connected and overlapping themes, employment and legal frameworks; social protection; regulating labour mobility and migration policy. For example, in September 2017, CERIC held a roundtable with employer groups including the Chamber of Commerce and Sector Skills bodies, civil society organisations campaigning for the rights of EU citizens in the UK and trade unions. Members of the CERIC team have also participated in roundtable events hosted by other partners including the Chamber of Commerce and regional migrant support networks and undertaken wider interviews with employment lawyers, faith and community organisations. The following summarises the themes emerging from these discussions and we conclude by setting out the implications for our research agenda.

 

The significance of labour mobility and freedom of movement

The different groups taking part in the research had contrasting positions in advance of the referendum vote. For example, most, but not all, trade unions advocated for ‘remain’ and were generally in favour of continuation of the free movement of workers. Business organisations took a more neutral stance due, in part, to business members being both ‘leave’ and ‘remain’ supporters, reflecting that some sectors such as hospitality, construction and the public sector are much more likely to be adversely affected by restrictions in the movement of EU workers, whereas other parts of their constituency were less likely to employ migrant workers. Unsurprisingly, those campaigning for the rights of EU citizens were in favour of remaining in the EU. Overall there was limited reflection given by employer or worker representatives on the merits or challenges presented by the existing policy of freedom of movement. Much more emphasis was placed on what might come next. There was an acceptance (albeit for some, a very reluctant acceptance) that there will be restrictions placed on future migration from the EU.

The discussion developed more broadly to cover future scenarios for the UK economy informed, in the main, by existing understanding of what had led to pre-Brexit levels of EU worker migration to the UK. These drivers were seen by business and worker representatives as inextricably linked to economic considerations such as UK and EU labour markets, pay and wages, skills supply and demand, levels of employment (and under-employment) and UK trade and investment decisions. Yet, the civil society groups that were campaigning for the rights of EU citizens in the UK reminded us that, while key drivers for migration is often work and employment, there also many social factors that shape labour mobility such as the quest for family re-union or education. In this regard a worrying report by colleagues at the University of Birmingham has been published recently[8], highlighting the legal limbo in which many EU families will find themselves in the field of family re-union. These observations made it problematic to talk about migration policy in isolation and illustrates the need for future migration policy to be developed with reference to wider policy considerations.  Rather than re-thinking the regulation of migration in isolation, remarks from the participants reflect that post-Brexit migration policy needs to be developed in the context of wider economic and social considerations.  This accords for example with the objectives of the current MAC commission on the employment of EEA workers which seeks to ‘aligning the UK immigration system with a modern industrial strategy (p20),’ yet many other aspects of related policy also need to be considered in terms the affect worker rights, labour standards, social and welfare rights.

Visions for EU labour migration under different Brexit scenarios

Different visions of future migration policy were expressed by the various stakeholder groups. Employer organisations taking part in the CERIC research were, over-time, less ardently free market oriented than might have been expected.  Initial positions stated by employer organisations in the months immediately after the referendum strongly expressed the desire for open migration regimes to meet the needs of employers seeking sourcing both high and lower skilled workers[9].  Over time, the tone expressed by some employer groups had shifted slightly to the acceptance of a migration system that may be more restrictive due to the need to be mindful of ‘politically acceptable’ outcomes. FlipchartHowever, umbrella organisations such as the CBI and Chamber have continued to push government for greater certainty on the rights of their EU workers, on hiring from EU countries during the negotiation period and to avoid overly bureaucratic processes for post-Brexit hires. One employer group, the CITB, were hopeful that a case could be made for special conditions to more easily allow recruitment from the EU to address ‘strategically important’ skills shortages. Others, such as the British Hospitality Association (BHA) have suggested a sector-based quota system for hospitality, considering that predicted annual recruitment need is over 100,000 people, assuming zero labour turnover amongst British born workers.[10]  The likely restrictions associated to the terms of residency for workers under these quota systems need however to be considered as part of the wider social implications that migration reform has on migrants’ rights and those of their families.

debateThe TUC and union participants in the CERIC roundtable were more clearly advocating for free movement and for the importance of free trade and the single market as an important mechanism in establishing a ‘level playing field’ making particular reference to the value of the Social Chapter[11] and its benefits for both ‘good’ businesses and for workers. Underpinning this position was a common assumption that withdrawal from the EU would lead to employment protections being weakened, threatening a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of worker rights and employment practices that also adversely affect those ‘good’ employers. There have been public assurances from the Government that workers’ rights will be maintained and even strengthened but many, including trade unionists, remain skeptical that this will be the case.

Current activity

The current activity of different interest groups could be grouped into three categories: developing more intelligence on labour mobility issues affecting members; developing support and guidance for constituents and looking to shape the political debate. The employer bodies participating in CERIC discussions were trying to improve data and analysis on the use of migrant labour amongst their membership to help assess the potential impact on the future workforce. They were also developing understanding of the potential for and limitations of employers using alternative strategies to make up for any loss of EU worker recruitment[12] through for example more training and development of indigenous workers or investment in new technologies. Yet the employer groups noted that gaps remained in their understanding of patterns of migrant labour demand or the longer term historical drivers that had shaped labour migration in specific sectors and regions. Many unions and employers were using legal services to keep themselves up to date with the negotiations between the UK and the EU, advising EU migrants among their members on how to apply for permanent residence under the current regulation. For example, the BHA is providing materials to help ensure that workers can exercise their rights to certification of permanent residency where applicable. This work also aims to have a positive effect in terms of boosting goodwill with EU workers towards hospitality sector employers. Trade unions were also directly engaging with EU migrant workers and community networks to provide advice to those concerned about their rights during the transition period.

Influencing the debate

CERIC’s initial research involved participants from international, national and regional organisations in order to explore the nature of dialogue at, and between, different levels.  At the international level, UK civil society groups have been campaigning to develop alliances with those leading campaigns promoting the interests of UK citizens in Europe and engaging directly with the EU negotiators to stress that EU labour mobility should be an intrinsic part of integration undertaken by the people of Europe themselves rather than a purely economic matter deriving from the rules of the single market. At the national level, all groups are making representations to government through formal and informal channels including to the relevant parliamentary scrutiny committees of DEXEU and Economic Affairs and the Home Office appointed commission on EEA migration being undertaken by the MAC. Regional groups, perhaps inevitably, made reference to the possibility of regional flexibilities in any migration system, notably to meet particularly localised skills needs. This focus is shaped by broader political tensions around the devolution of powers to the UK nations and regions of the UK including the devolution of budgets around skills training and infrastructure. This view was given focus by an early report by the Institute of Public Policy Research which contained six proposed options for the new immigration policy one of which included the suggestion of sub-state solutions to migration policy[13].

Conflicting and Common issues

Our roundtable discussions included some robust (yet cordial) difference of opinion around:  visions of future policy and the impact of new migration regulations on employers and citizens. In particular we noticed different understandings of what “regulation” means. Employer bodies associated migration policies with the possible risk of increased bureaucracy, notably at the point of recruitment. In contrast, trade union representatives regarded regulation positively in the form of protections of standards for workers. Unions stressed that proposals requiring workers to have employer sponsors could make migrant workers more dependent upon those employers, limiting their voice. An obvious paradox emerges in that employers were highlighting the cost of compliance and unions the cost of non-compliance or regulation that enables the potential for greater exploitation of workers, thereby lowering labour standards.

In terms of common threads, there were four areas where there was a convergence of views: firstly, the need to assure security for those EU workers already in the UK and their families; secondly, that student numbers should not be included in migration statistics; and, thirdly, that there was need for greater dialogue between different groups of stakeholders to build a better consensus on the way forward, not just toward Brexit, but after the exit date and beyond. Finally, it was also notable that there was a common view amongst stakeholders that investment in local, indigenous, labour was seen as a possible alternative strategy that could mitigate against the need for migrant labour. This runs counter to an alternative perspective: the  skills and training of indigenous workers could be seen as positively related to the use of migrant labour. This is a theme that the interim MAC report of March 2018 noted,[14] providing illustrations of how the recruitment of skilled European workers contributed to improved training levels. The final report by MAC on EEA workers, due in September 2018, will look specifically at the impact of the employment of EEA workers on the UK resident population, including the impact on training.

Next steps

It remains to be seen how UK government and EU negotiators will re-shape labour migration regulation to adequately address the demands of civic, business and labour organisations in the UK while giving regard to the outcome of the referendum vote. This continues to take place within an uncertain and volatile political environment.  The early stage research undertaken by CERIC researchers has provided insights into the ongoing challenges and activity of different groups trying to anticipate and shape policy appropriately for and on behalf of their members. Key themes emerged for the future directions for research. This includes the need to improve understanding of the regional and sectoral dimensions of the ‘EU workforce’, how patterns of migrant employment have developed and the roles that different institutional actors have played in facilitating these trends and finally, how migration policy will evolve in relation to related (socio-) economic policy such as the UK Industrial Strategy.

This requires taking more historical and sociologically informed perspectives to help move the debate forward. A deeper analysis will help different interest groups anticipate the implications of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ BREXIT scenarios. The co-production approach has illustrated the willingness of different parties to strengthen and deepen the level of debate, enhance understanding of different positions and provide opportunities to influence debate at the local, national and international levels. Participants recognised the value of exploring policy proposals through joint analysis of tensions and common ground to help unpack the content of proposed policy develop understanding of potential impacts on the rights and responsibilities of different groups helping to move the debate beyond current political narratives focused primarily on annual immigration targets. CERIC researchers will continue to bring these voices together, highlighting points of tensions as well as commonalities, contributing to the development of research informed public debate and policy that will shape the social model of a post-Brexit Britain that will, whatever the outcome of specific migration policy, to continue to be inextricably linked to that of its European neighbours.

[1] https://www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-citizens-families/applying-for-settled-status

[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/impact-of-eea-and-non-eea-workers-in-uk-labour-market-responses

[3] https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/home-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/inquiry4/

[4] Office for National statistics. Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: February 2018 Available at:  https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/february2018#fewer-eu-migrants-coming-to-the-uk-for-work

[5] EU15 country members prior to the 2004 enlargement; EU8 those joining in the 2004 enlargement

[6] YouGov Top Issues Trackers (2017-2018); Ipsos-MORI Issues Index (May2018)

[7] For a discussion of co-production in social science research see for example https://www.n8research.org.uk/view/5163/Final-Report-Co-Production-2016-01-20.pdf

[8] https://eurochildren.info/2018/03/28/a-generation-of-children-of-eu-parents-to-be-lost-in-the-intricacies-of-brexit-research-reveals/

[9] http://www.britishchambers.org.uk/policy-maker/policy-reports-and-publications/business-brexit-priorities.html

[10] http://www.bha.org.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/BHA-Brexit-Consultation-11116.pdf

[11] https://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter

[12] http://www.britishchambers.org.uk/Business%20Brexit%20Checklist%20BCC.pdf

[13] https://www.ippr.org/research/publications/an-immigration-strategy-for-the-uk

[14] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/694494/eea-workers-uk-labour-market-interim-update.pdf

CERIC members publish Work, Employment and Society Special Issue

Screen Shot 2018-06-05 at 13.37.11

Early career researchers, Gabriella Alberti, Ioulia Bessa, Kate Hardy, Vera Trappmann and Charles Umney have published a Special Issue of the high-ranking journal Work, Employment and Society.

The issue “In, Against and Beyond Precarity: The Struggles of Insecure Workers” contains pieces spanning geographic contexts from China to Chile and Britain to Brussels. The issue follows the 2016 Work, Employment and Society conference which was organised and hosted by Centre of Employment Relations Innovation and Change (CERIC) at the University of Leeds. Authors from Finland, Hong Kong, Germany, Denmark, Peru and the UK have contributed excellent pieces on workers including taxi-drivers, couriers, managers, mine and public-sector workers. In the round, they offer a close interrogation of the notion of precarity and the insecurity it produces, bringing in issues relating to worker struggle, the standard employment relationship and supply chain.

In their introduction, the CERIC editors take to task the concept of ‘precarity’, arguing instead that a focus on ‘processes of precarisation’ may be more analytically helpful for understanding the range of contexts in which the term is applied. They also point to the need to think about work and labour in the broadest terms, emphasizing a ‘need to address precariousness in the realm of social reproduction and post-wage politics’ as well as more formal studies of employment.

The Special Issue is on Open Access until 2nd July.

The ‘Made Smarter’ review: a road to utopia or dystopia in negotiating the future of skills, apprenticeships and work?

By Maisie Roberts, CERIC Postgraduate Researcher

pandora's box

Junge, A. 2005. Pandora’s Box #1: Found Toolbox with Neon

The future of work: dystopia or utopia?

The recent industry-led independent Made Smarter review chaired by Professor Jurgen Maier, CEO of Siemens, provides a future vision of the UK’s industrial landscape in terms of advancing the remit of digital technology. Training and upskilling are central components of achieving a utopian future vision. However, the future of work seems to hinge on Maier’s warning (2017: 11):

“Get it wrong, and we risk further de-industrialising our economy, and becoming ever more reliant on imports. Get it right, and we will have found the key to rebalancing and strengthening our economy, creating many new, exciting, and well-paid jobs, and leading a renaissance for the UK as a true nation of creators and makers.”

From this perspective, the future of work remains a highly contested point of discussion, centred on two extremes, which either seem to epitomise a utopian land of promise or a scaremongering nightmarish dystopia. Indeed, when we think of the future of work we conjure up rather dystopian images of the superiority of artificial intelligence-driven robots who have the power and skill to take over the whole spectrum of work, leaving us without any hope of meaningful work. Precarious employment contracts, disposable workforces, intensified working hours and minimal employment rights are already a sad reality. Beyond this the underworld of Silicon Valley casts an unsettling shadow over society where our digital footprints are tracked, extradited and sold to feed a dystopian-like machine. Has Pandora’s box been opened with no return? And what’s the alternative?

 Trouble in utopia?  Skills and the fourth industrial revolution

 Currently, technology, innovation and digitalisation are key incentives for national economies and skills and training are viewed as essential in achieving aptitude in this area. Economies are revising their technologies and capabilities in line with this so-called ‘fourth industrial revolution’.

The first revolution used water and steam to power production whilst the second relied on electric power for mass production. The third drew on information technology to create automated production lines. The fourth builds on the foundations of the third, but merges physical, digital and biological realms to create new technologies. Amongst other emerging phenomena this includes the rise of big data and the Internet of Things, where cyber-physical systems communicate and exchange data with each other and with humans in real-time.

The process of creating a commodity has therefore changed from one where manual work would physically create a product from raw materials to one where technological and information-led networks shape new “modes of development” in an increasingly globalised context (Castells, 1996). This presents the question whether the nature of skill is changing under this new guise of capitalism underpinned by the “information age”.

This might mean that new skills are needed to navigate between raw materials and new technology, data and software, changing existing job structures as well as creating new jobs altogether. Here, skill is therefore essential to facilitate technological advancement. Indeed the World Economic Forum (2016) calls for complex problem-solving, creativity, critical thinking and teamwork amongst other skills, which are viewed as essential in navigating us into a utopian future of the fourth industrial revolution.

Conversely, there could be a move to the growing but rather dystopian phenomena of a so-called ‘lights out’ methodology. Under this approach, human labour becomes obsolete as factories become solely operated via automation with the ‘lights out’ to save on production costs, increase profit margins and respond to increased customer demand. Frey and Osbourne’s (2013) infamous paper, which estimates that 47% of all US employment is susceptible to computerisation certainly plays to this analogy.

Uncertainty ahead: The case of Germany and England

The fourth industrial revolution still remains very much a future vision, and one, which is not yet fully realised. How skills strategy integrates into the future vision of work remains uncertain as demonstrated by Germany and England.

Germany

The ‘dual’ German apprenticeship system adopts a corporatist and coordinated approach, in which both firms and vocational schools provide highly structured training (Bosch, 2010). Apprenticeships are protected from market forces in an almost utopian enclave where unions, chambers, employers and the state work collectively and pro-actively together to regulate the future path of the system.

Although Germany seems to epitomise a perfect apprenticeship system, it, too, is facing significant challenges. Previously up to 75% of young people would typically undertake an apprenticeship (Grugulis, 2007) but since 2013 university starts has overtaken apprenticeship starts and this number is rising (BMBF, 2016). Higher education is becoming a more popular option, much like the UK, with the promise of a free university education and higher graduate wages a key incentive for this choice.

Equally, the entire context and character of Germany’s labour market has changed too with the implementation of the Hartz reforms over 10 years ago, which brought in temporary, agency or so-called ‘mini’ jobs as well as cuts in unemployment welfare assistance. The traditional purpose of an apprenticeship was to provide comprehensive training to catapult an individual into a secure and permanent occupation for life. Yet the evolving fragmentation of Germany’s labour market could undermine the stability, time and effort required to develop well- defined routes to employment.

Germany’s pro-active strategy of “re-imagining work” through its “Work 4.0” concept highlighted in its initial green paper (2015), followed up by its white paper (2017) aims to tackle some of these issues. The reports highlight the need for occupational profiles to be adapted to meet changing skill demands, increasing continuing vocational training, more support for SMEs to develop training and a monitoring system to forecast future demand of skilled labour. The decreasing labour supply of young people is mentioned and as such the report calls for the opening up of skilled labour to more migrants, low-skilled workers, women, older people and disabled people. However, the reports do not seem to directly address the growing prevalence of higher education, which many have argued is leading to growing inequality and a reduction of firms participating (Thelen and Busemeyer, 2012). The future of apprenticeships therefore remains somewhat ambiguous in the Work 4.0 agenda.

England

England’s system is voluntarist and employer-led, with employers solely designing, regulating and managing the system. England lacks the collective ethos and stability of the German system. The English system is also prone to continuous political upheaval, particularly since the Thatcher years where participation in apprenticeships drastically declined (Gospel, 1995).

An apprenticeship levy was introduced in April this year with the aim to increase apprenticeship participation to 3 million apprenticeships by 2020. The levy targets employers with a pay bill over £3million, affecting 2% of firms. However, recent reports highlight that since the levy apprenticeship starts have decreased by 59% (BBC, 2017). Equally, only half of the eligible levy firms have actually registered to reclaim levy funds (CIPD, 2017). This suggests that many firms are disregarding the levy as a tax instead of a social responsibility to invest in apprenticeships. Hence, although the levy has good intentions, perhaps the inherently market-led nature of England’s economy deters employers from investing in the costs and time needed to create high quality apprenticeships.

The recent industrial strategy aims to reform the UK’s technical education system to make it more internationally competitive, invest £406m in STEM skills and create a new National Retraining Scheme to allow people reskill in the labour market. Much like the recent Made Smarter review, training and skills exemplify the road to utopia in the policy discourse. However, UK’s intermediate skills ranking is projected to stand at only 28th of 33 OECD countries by 2020 (UKCES, 2015) and its productivity figures were recently downgraded from the predicted 2% growth for this year down to 1.5%, soon to be followed by 1.3% in 2019 (OBR, 2017), the same rate as during financial crisis.

The Made Smarter review focuses in on these challenges. Firstly, it argues that lack of effective national leadership and cross-sector collaboration has failed to achieve a coherent strategy of industrial digitalisation. Secondly, poor productivity, limited business support, cybersecurity threats and significant skills shortages due to the fragmented apprenticeship system leads to poor levels of adoption of the digitalisation agenda, particularly among SMEs. Finally, the UK’s infrastructure does not support the scaling-up of technology to support companies, meaning that innovation is under-leveraged. As such, the need for training is paramount in the report, which calls for the upskilling of a million industrial workers. Yet the current employer-led approach to apprenticeships in England, where the nature of the market dictates its future, contrasts to this utopian image.

Summing up

 Utopia, true to its definition as both a no-place and a good place, is a useful framing device, which helps us consider what we might want for ourselves in our future society. The Made Smarter review offers us two very different future outcomes, one with new, exciting and well-paid jobs, creating a society of creators and makers, or, an alternative route towards a de-industrialised, stagnant and import-reliant society. Juergen Maier clearly acknowledges that the UK faces a number of challenges in creating his future vision of industry and employment, including poor productivity and infrastructure. Lack of coordination, leadership and collaboration amongst businesses, academia and other institutions are also listed as central concerns.  Interestingly, Germany’s “re-imagining work” white paper actively engaged in a public dialogue and called upon workers, businesses, unions and other institutions to help contribute to the future vision of work in partnership together. This helped to ease the mystery behind the notion of digitalisation and its implications on work, whilst providing a voice for all in navigating towards a collective vision of the future world of work.

From this perspective, we need to ask what skills and work we really value in society today. Apprenticeships, training and skills development can clearly provide increased national productivity, innovation and meaningful job creation if implemented correctly (Finegold and Soskice, 1989). Yet apprenticeships are too often considered as a magical tool to swiftly solve all of society’s problems, such as youth unemployment, deepening skills gaps and productivity slumps to name a few (Keep and Mayhew, 2010), without much consideration of what is actually needed to secure these essentially utopian benefits. If we truly admire the inherent value of skills and apprenticeships as a means to meaningful and productive employment for society, more weight, investment, regulation and prestige needs to be placed on them.

References

BBC. 2017. Apprenticeship numbers fall by 59% after levy imposed. [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42092171

BMBF (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung). 2016. Report on Vocational Education and Training 2016. [Online]. [No Place]: Federal Ministry of Education and Research. [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Available from: https://www.bmbf.de/pub/Berufsbildungsbericht_2016_eng.pdf

Castells, M. 1996. The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

CIPD. 2017. Half of Eligible businesses register to reclaim apprenticeship levy funds. [Online] [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Available from:  http://www2.cipd.co.uk/pm/peoplemanagement/b/weblog/archive/2017/10/09/half-of-eligible-businesses-register-to-reclaim-apprenticeship-levy-funds.aspx

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 2017. Made Smarter. Review 2017. [Online] [Accessed 1 November 2017]. London: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655570/20171027_MadeSmarter_FINAL_DIGITAL.pdf

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 2017. Industrial Strategy: building a Britain fit for the future. [Online] [Accessed 1 November 2017]. London: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664563/industrial-strategy-white-paper-web-ready-version.pdf

Federal Institute for Labour and Social Affairs. 2017. Re-Imagining Work, White paper, Work 4.0. [Online] [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Berlin: Federal Institute for Labour and Social Affairs. Available from: http://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/PDF-Publikationen/a883-white-paper.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3

Federal Institute for Labour and Social Affairs. 2015. Re-Imagining Work, Green paper, Work 4.0. [Online] [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Berlin: Federal Institute for Labour and Social Affairs. Available from: http://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF-Publikationen/arbeiten-4-0-green-paper.pdf;jsessionid=FFFC52E6F5D81905E8B5D4EE90F3E69C?__blob=publicationFile&v=2

Finegold, D. and Soskice, D. 1988. The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 4(3), pp. 21-53.

Frey, C, B. and Osbourne, M. 2013. The Future of Employment: How Susceptible are Jobs to Computerisation? Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114, pp. 254-280

Gospel, H. 1995. The Decline of Apprenticeship Training in Britain, Industrial Relations Journal, 26(1), pp. 32-44.

Grugulis, I. 2007. Skills, Training and Human Resource Development: A Critical Text. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Junge, A. 2005. Pandora’s Box #1: Found Toolbox with Neon [Online] [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Available from:  http://www.jungeart.com/assemb/photo_display.php?start=4

Keep, E, and Mayhew, K. 2010. Moving beyond skills as a social and economic panacea, Work, Employment and Society, 24(3), pp. 565-577.

OBR (Office for Budget Responsibility). 2017. Economic Fiscal Outlook. [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Available from: http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org.uk/Nov2017EFOwebversion-2.pdf

Thelen, K. and Busemeyer, M. 2012. Institutional Change in German Vocational Training: From Collectivism toward Segmentalism. In: Busemeyer, M. and Trampusch, C, eds. The Political Economy of Collective Skill Formation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 68-100.

UKCES. 2015. UK Skills Levels and International Competitiveness 2014. [Online] [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Available from:  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470017/skill_levels_2014.pdf

World Economic Forum, 2016. The 10 skills you need to thrive in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. [Online] [Accessed 1 November 2017]. Available from: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-10-skills-you-need-to-thrive-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/

 

 

 

Alexandra Seehaus (Visiting Fellow, CERIC) reviews Oliver Nachtwey’s book, currently only available in German.

Alex Seehaus

Alex Seehaus, Visiting Fellow, CERIC

Oliver Nachtwey’s “The descent society. On Rebellion in the Regressive Modern Age”

Running up a downwards escalator

The election results to the German Parliament on Sunday 24th made a far right nationalist party (Alternative für Deutschland “Alternative for Germany” ) the third biggest party in the Lower House of Parliament. While among the electorate there are nationalist, racists, and neo-nazis, a huge number of people declared they voted for them out of protest against the existing government. Many of those engaging in a protest vote were members of the middle classes with middle incomes, who are afraid to lose their status and class position, due to the increase of migrants and refugees and an increased insecurity. To place this in context and understand some of this background to this turn of events, it is worthwhile to read Oliver Nachtwey’s book which explores changed mobility patterns in German society.

Oliver Nachtwey has offered a staggering account of this phenomenon in Germany, which has made it into the top selling lists of the online bookshop Amazon Germany and was recently awarded with the Hans-Matthöfer-prize for heterodox economic and sociological writing.

Nachtwey sees the social promise that has kept the German society together over the last seventy years as lost. There is no longer an ‘ascent society’ in Germany, but it has instead been replaced by one of descent. The divide between rich and poor has increased and the dynamics of social mobility have changed, to the detriment of those at the bottom. Instead of climbing up the ladder to the top, people are now making a constant effort in order not to descend, simply to hold their position. Given the fact that a majority of the public still seems persuaded by the idea of meritocracy and the belief in collective upward mobility, such developments contradict common expectations. As hard work and ongoing growth were supposed to guarantee constant status improvement, it’s mere absence causes disappointment for employees and is perceived as social descent.
Descent is a problem for society as a whole. It affects not only those whose situation is getting worse, but also causes stagnation and widespread fear. According to Nachtwey such situation is characterised by polarisation and precarity, resulting in an erosion of social integration. What he sees arising in its place is a new social question about the emergence of ‘working poor’ and unequal distribution of wealth and chances for social mobility, which threatens democracy and provokes protest.

The book not only offers a precise analysis of social inequality and struggles within democratic capitalism. Its intellectual strength lies in the way in which aspects – which often remain separate – are brought together. This includes observations on post-democracy, findings on underclasses and precarious working conditions, pressure on middle classes, as well as thesis on stagnating capitalism and low growth expectations.
Nachtwey’s analysis builds on the work of sociologist Ulrich Beck, who depicts the upward mobility in the prospering welfare state of post-war Germany as collective elevator effect. According to Nachtwey, this metaphor has become obsolete, as people no longer move up together. The ‘steady ascent’ has ended with the deterioration of standard employment, flexibilisation, and the dismantling of social security, which went hand-in-hand with former life structures, careers and vocational paths. Instead, the collective and individual dimensions of ascent and descent have come apart. In Nachtwey’s metaphor everyone stands by oneself on the escalator stairs. Those on the top are still moving up, but for a big number of people in the middle and the bottom the direction has changed. They instead attempt to run up a descending escalator. While such an image might be considered somewhat bold, since empirical data shows that individual descent has not become a mass phenomenon and ascent is still possible, it captures the increasing distance between top and bottom as well as the important trend of precarisation collectively faced by a growing number of employees in Germany.

According to Nachtwey, people in Germany have lost trust in the notion of stability. Despite the fact that lower classes, those with less education, older as well as young people, and those with migrant status, struggle in the current labour market situation, middle class people also feel threatened by the potential and actual loss of jobs and social status. The erosion of social integration is therefore not only caused by actual descent, but also collective fear of it, which impedes solidarity. Whether concerning the conflict between employees and unemployed, permanent and temporary staff; residents and migrants; or discrimination between age groups, society has become polarised. And unfortunately this is what we see coming true with the recent elections.

Nachtwey is aware of the potential resentments and reactionary tendencies within the politics and movements addressing the deteriorating situation of the working population, such as those supporting the far right out of ‘protest’. While he points out the dangers of right wing populism, he also has some hope. In identifying the current tendencies as a tension between capitalism and democracy, there is potential for this not only to fuel regressive forms of critique and protest, but also to offer potential to progress towards a more solidaric modern age. It will, however, require progressive forces to engage energetically in efforts to turn the hostile public and political atmosphere around and to channel such tendencies away from right wing populism and towards a more distributory, fair and equitable political landscape.

Why so-called ‘Barista Visas’ won’t help UK Hospitality Workers

Version 2
Matthew Cole

Home Secretary Amber Rudd has recently introduced the idea of a so-called ‘barista visa’, undoubtedly to militate against the potentially disastrous effects of Brexit for UK businesses. The proposal was suggested by Lord Green, chairman of the right-wing think tank Migration Watch UK, who claimed it would, “kill two birds with one stone” by meeting employer needs while “maintaining links with the EU”. By links, he must have meant links to a highly exploitable workforce with no rights. The ‘barista visa’ would allow young European citizens to migrate to the UK and work in the hospitality industry for up to 2 years; however, it would deny them access to benefits, schooling, housing or any possibility of extending their stay. The proposed visa would be modelled on the Tier 5 (youth mobility scheme) visa, which currently allows 18-to-30-year-olds with at least £1,890 in savings from non-E.U. countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan to work in the U.K. for up to 24 months. Despite the government’s optimism, the ‘barista visa’ would not only fail to offer adequate solutions to Brexit, it would exacerbate issues in the industry for both employer and employees.

The hospitality industry (including hotels, bars, cafes and restaurants) makes a significant contribution to the UK economy. The industry added an estimated £57 billion to the economy in 2014, roughly 4% of GDP and it employs around 3 million people in the UK.  Since 2011, it has grown by 13%, more than double the employment growth of the economy overall. Yet in the context of this dramatic growth, working conditions remain poor. Average gross earnings for full-time workers in the hotel industry are the lowest in the UK and the industry has the highest incidence of low-paid workers. Added to this is its dubious status as one of the least unionised sector of the economy.

Today, the hospitality industry is experiencing increasing instability and pressure as a result of Brexit. Britain leaving the EU will no doubt have serious and lasting impacts on the UK labour market and workers rights. According to the ONS, E.U. nationals make up 7% (2.2 million) of Britain’s total labour market of 30.3 million. However, some industries will be more affected than others and the hospitality – with over 60,000 workers per annum working in this sector – is likely to be one of those feeling the impact of the referendum result. A report by KPMG indicates that hospitality is the largest business sector employer of EU nationals as a proportion of total workforce. Hotels and restaurants employ the highest percentage of EU migrants with certain roles such as waiters and waitresses (75.3% EU nationals), housekeeping staff and chefs representing a particularly high portion of migrants. Based on current projections, the absence of an annual inflow of new EU migrants into the hospitality industry each year would generate a significant recruitment gap, which would increase over time.

Despite it’s moniker the ‘barista visa’ scheme would fail from a business standpoint .The two-year limit alone is reason enough to anticipate this, since it forecloses incentives for training and retaining workers in an industry that is experiencing serious problems with skill shortages and turnover. According to People 1st, turnover in the hospitality industry is estimated at 20 per cent, while the KPMG survey of BHA members puts the estimate even higher, at 50.2 per cent. This costs the industry approximately £274 million annually. The Financial Times, reported that the ‘barista visa’ would also be open to other sectors that are heavily reliant on low-wage migrant labour, such as social care, agriculture, and construction. While the numbers of migrants for each industry will be restricted with an overall cap, there is no guarantee that there would be enough EU migrants who meet the proposed criteria and aim to work in hospitality. Last year, The Times reported that only 40,000 people applied on the existing Tier 5 youth mobility scheme for all industries. This is 20,000 less than the number of EU migrants who gained employment in the hospitality industry alone. Given the strict criteria of the ‘barista visa’ and the fact that the hospitality industry is expanding rapidly the number of EU migrants is likely to fall woefully short of the needs of employers. Combine this with low wages and the rising anti-migrant rhetoric of mainstream political parties and the situation looks dire indeed.

To attempt to lessen the impact of Brexit, BHA members have petitioned the government to retain EU workers and openness for tourism. They recognise how important migrant labour is for their businesses even if they have not necessarily recognised the rights and economic rights of migrants as a whole. The BHA’s focus on the business case for hospitality ignores the concerns of most of its labour force. Historically, they have opposed legislation designed to protect workers’ interests such as the minimum wage legislation in 1999 and tips legislation in 2009. They have also avoided addressing criticisms from trade unionists about issues in the industry. Last year, Unite regional officer Dave Turnbull offered a different explanation of why the industry cannot recruit and retain the type of workers it needs. He cited a fundamentally “flawed, low cost and exploitative business model” in an industry where “low pay, insecure working, exploitation and institutionalised bullying are rife”[1]. The ‘barista visa’ will only exacerbate these problems. It would further entrench divisions in the labour market and further undermine the collective rights of workers. The scheme denies migrants a social safety net and offers no chance to progress in a career or build a life in the U.K. long-term.

The ‘barista visa’ also fails from a worker’s perspective. Labour Force data shows EU nationals are already concentrated in low-paid and lower-level occupations, especially in the hospitality industry. As of 2016, less than 1% of EU nationals in the hospitality industry were employed in the ‘higher managerial and professional’ occupation grouping. The current state of UK labour law weaves issues of migrant rights into the employment relationship, leaving open the potential for employers to terminate their contract which could effectively leave them exposed to deportation. The ‘barista visa’ ultimately will keep EU migrants in a legally subordinate position to nationals, exacerbating the ‘migrant division of labour’[2] and further undermining all working conditions. The further precarisation of migrant labourers in the hospitality industry will at best allow business owners to continue exploitative practices and at worst, further divide workers.

[1] Unite, 2016. Unite in direct plea to London mayor to tackle exploitative work practices in London’s hotel industry. Press Release. http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/unite-in-direct-plea-to-london-mayor-to-tackle-exploitative-work-practices-in-londons-hotel-industry/